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On the Merits: A Response to
Professor Sherry
John C.P. Goldberg*
It is accepted wisdom among constitutional law scholars that the Supreme
Court is now considerably more conservative than it was during the tenure of
Chief Justice Earl Warren.'

Professor Sherry's Article has three parts. The first is
doctrinal and undertakes to demonstrate that the above quoted
wisdom is not only false, but patently so. It is apparent, this Part
argues, that the current Court has not drifted toward the "right," but
has steadfastly held to the principle of justice that animated the
Warren Court. 2 This is the principle of "formal neutrality," which
generally holds that government may never distinguish among its
citizens on the basis of race, creed, or color.
Professor Sherry's second project is to explain why constitutional scholars have failed to recognize this obvious consistency. 3 Her
ultimate explanation is somewhat involved. In outline it proceeds as
follows. It is the academy, not the Court, that has changed. In particular, the modern academy has rejected neutrality. Moreover, it has
rejected neutrality not only in its incarnation as the substantive
moral principle of formal neutrality, but also in its incarnation as the
epistemological meta-principle that substantive moral principles can
be justified by appeal to neutral, objective reasons. The academy's
critique of the current Court as "conservative" expresses this twin
rejection of formal neutrality and of neutrality as objectivity. The
academy condemns the Court's continued commitment to formal neutrality as conservative because the academy regards formal neutrality
as nothing more than a slogan used by the Court to mask its partisan
agenda of maintaining white privilege.
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Thanks to Jim Blumstein, Rebecca
Brown, Chris Eisgruber, Julie Faber, Barry Friedman, Thomas McCoy, Bob Rasmussen, Tony
Sebok, Nick Zeppos, and Ben Zipursky for their help. Remaining errors are mine.
1.
Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the
Warren Court, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 459, 459 (1997).
Id. at 477.
2.
3.
Id. at 459.
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In the third Part of her Article, Professor Sherry argues that
the academy should not abandon the meta-principle of neutral, objective reason.4 She further maintains that the embrace of reason
logically leads to the embrace of formal neutrality, because the rationality of that principle is obvious and intuitive-hence the allusion in
her title to the popular self-help book that claims all we need to know
as adults are the simple truths we learned in kindergarten.
Accordingly, the academy should endorse rather than critique the
commitment of both the Warren Court and the current Court to the
principle of formal neutrality.
I share some of the concerns that animate Professor Sherry's
Article, particularly her worry over the careless use of labels like
"conservative" and her anxiety over many legal academics' apparent
enchantment with moral skepticism. Nevertheless, I hope to show in
this Comment that the particular arguments that she has marshaled
to meet these concerns are ineffective because overstated. There are
significant senses in which the current Court may be described as
conservative. Moreover, to the extent the academy has misattributed
conservatism to the Court, this misattribution is not explained by the
academy's embrace of moral skepticism. Finally, I am unpersuaded
that formal neutrality is obviously or intuitively the most appealing
available conception of justice.

I.
Professor Sherry claims that if one bothers to read the
decisions of the Warren Court and what she calls the "current Court"
in two core areas of constitutional law-equal protection and free
speech-one will readily see a shared commitment to the principle of
formal neutrality. 5 That principle requires that each law, "on its face,
treat all races with equal solicitude and all views with equal tolerance."6 As manifested in the Courts' decisions, the principle of formal
neutrality denies legislatures the right to distinguish among persons
on the basis of their respective races or beliefs. Thus, according to
Professor Sherry, the decisions of both the Warren Court and the
4.
Id. at 483-85.
5.
Id. at 459-60. A desire to skirt the inconvenient datum of Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (holding that FCC minority preference policies "do not violate
equal protection principles"), overruled by Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995) perhaps explains why Professor Sherry refers to the "current [1997?]
Court," rather than the "Rehnquist Court."
6.
Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 477 (cited in note 1).
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current Court clearly state that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause prohibits legislatures from enacting laws that in
any way take account of the race of those subject to the laws.'
A fictional narrative may help illuminate the strength of this
claim. Imagine that it was a young lawyer named Smith who, in
1967, appeared before the Court and successfully argued on behalf of
Richard and Mildred Loving." Triumphant and tired, Smith thereafter retreated to (what else?) a remote desert island. Roughly thirty
years later, a restored Smith is summoned back to argue before the
current Court on behalf of Adarand Constructors.9 According to
Professor Sherry, when Smith reacquaints himself with the country
and the recent work of the Court, he will quickly realize that, apart
from altering the width of his tie and the length of his sideburns (and
perhaps toning down--or at least de-gendering-his famous flourishes
about the "basic civil rights of man" 0 ), he should not change his presentation. The Court's recent decisions should make it quite plain to
Smith that he is, for all intents and purposes, arguing another case
before the Warren Court and that he thus has his best chance of prevailing by reasserting the "colorblind" equal protection arguments he
made in 1967.
Professor Sherry's assertion that the current Court is no more
or less conservative than the Warren Court is intended to serve as a
corrective to what she believes is a reflexive tendency among academics to condemn the current Court as "conservative" while praising the
Warren Court as "liberal."" In responding to this concern, however,
Professor Sherry has overstated her case in such a way as to commit
the sin that she decries. If it is unhelpful simply to call the current
Court "conservative," it is equally unhelpful simply to call it the
Warren Court.

Id. at 461, 463, 468 (explaining that any attempt, whether benign or invidious, to
7.
distinguish between persons on the basis of color violates formal neutrality).
8.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
9.
10. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. As Professor Brown points out in her comment, Lovings
invocation of fundamental rights provides evidence that it was not decided on the principle of
formal neutrality. See Rebecca L. Brown, Formal Neutrality in the Warren and Rehnquist
Courts: Illusions of Similarity, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 487, 493-94 (1997).
11. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 459 (cited in note 1).
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Part of the problem resides in Professor Sherry's own loose use
of the term conservative. To clarify matters, I offer the following
12
tentative definitions:
Doctrinal conservatism: the belief that judges should
adhere to a relatively strict version of stare decisis; a judicial
unwillingness to depart from settled legal doctrine.
Judicial conservatism: the belief that the Judicial Branch
ought to be reluctant to interfere with the operation of the
political branches based on allegations that those branches have
13
violated some standard of justice or right.
Political conservatism: the belief that government should
hesitate to interfere with private activity and in particular,
should not take measures to redistribute wealth or
opportunities.
Social conservatism: the belief in preserving certain traditional social, cultural, and moral institutions or values, whether
by government action or inaction.
When Professor Sherry asserts that the current Court is no more or
less conservative than the Warren Court, she is claiming that it is no
more or less judicially or politically conservative, and that it has thus
been doctrinally conservative vis-A-vis Warren Court precedents.
Professor Sherry believes that this claim merely states the
obvious. 14 But it is neither obvious nor even true. For better or
worse, the current Court has not demonstrated across-the-board
doctrinal conservatism with respect to Warren Court precedents.
Moreover, the current Court's doctrinal innovations have often
(although not always) reflected a greater degree of judicial
conservatism than those of the Warren Court. Even Professor Sherry
admits that the current Court's decisions bearing on criminal
defendants' rights are "almost incontrovertibly more conservative"
than comparable Warren Court decisions. 5 This distinction is not
adequately addressed by her surprising claim that criminal procedure
is not part of the world of constitutional law scholarship.16 Even
outside of criminal constitutional law, the current Court has issued
12. These definitions are drawn in part from Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Pedigrees of
Rights and Powers in Scalia'sCruzan Concurrence, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 283, 292-94 (1994); David
A. Strauss, Tradition,Precedent,and Justice Scalia, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1699, 1705-08 (1991).
13. Judicial conservatism is usually founded on rights-skepticism, on court-skepticism, or
on some combination of the two. See Lawrence G. Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based
Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 417, 418 (1981).
14. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 475-76 (cited in note 1).
15. Id. at 476.
16. Id.
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important constitutional decisions that depart from Warren Court
doctrine via outright overrulings and truncations of precedent, as well
as doctrinal revival and doctrinal innovations. Some of these departures evince a more judicially conservative approach to the constitutional doctrine in question,17 while others are less judicially conservative. 18 Members of the academy therefore have legitimate grounds for
describing the current Court as being in some respects "conservative."
At least, then, Professor Sherry is guilty of overstatement. She
might, however, retreat from her exaggerated initial claim and more
narrowly argue (and from here on I shall take her to argue) that the
Warren Court and the current Court demonstrate equal conservatism
only with respect to equal protection and free speech jurisprudence.
Cast in this circumscribed manner, Professor Sherry's claim is
considerably more promising. It still needs further qualification,
however, particularly with respect to the law of equal protection.19
The Warren Court's decisions in Brown v. Board of Education"°
and Bolling v. Sharpe2, signaled the Court's commitment to eliminating federal and state de jure discrimination. As Professor Sherry
notes, however, the Court was never very explicit about the principle
undergirding these decisions. 22 Thus, since the time of those and
subsequent related decisions, scholars have debated their proper
interpretation. 23 Herbert Wechsler, of course, famously argued that

17. For familiar doctrinal departures that are more judicially conservative and potentially
less politically conservative, see Employment Division Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (recasting settled free exercise jurisprudence and reducing
judicial scrutiny of the regulation of religious activity); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(truncating the right to privacy doctrine and permitting legislative control of certain sexual
practices). See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the slow demise of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
18. For doctrinal departures that are judicially non-conservative (that is, intrusive on the
activity of the political branches) and potentially more politically conservative, see BMW v.
Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996) (striking a punitive damage award for violating
the substantive due process rights of the defendant); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131
L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995) (possibly reviving the pre-New Deal account of limited congressional
powers under the Commerce Clause).
19. Professor Sherry's strongest case for doctrinal conservatism is in the free speech area,
although, as she recognizes, it is certainly arguable that in this area the current Court has
departed from Warren Court precedent by being less judicially conservative and more speech
protective. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 472 n.77 (cited in note 1) (noting that United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), "would be decided differently today").
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
22. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 463 (cited in note 1).
23. See Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 503, 505
(1997).

542

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 50:537

there was no principle to be found. 24 Others have contested this
claim. Some have maintained, as does Professor Sherry, that the
Warren Court adopted the formal neutrality principle that legislation
may never treat individuals differently solely because of their
different races. 25 Others have argued that these decisions expressed a
commitment on the part of the federal government, originally
expressed in the Civil War Amendments, to help ensure that African
Americans achieve the free and secure status traditionally enjoyed by
white Americans.26 The difference between these propositions is
important. The latter at least allows for the possibility that the Equal
Protection Clause permits legislation that draws racial distinctions
for benign purposes such as advancement of historically disfavored
groups, an idea sometimes expressed and justified negatively in terms
of a principle of "antisubjugation" or positively in terms of equal
opportunity. 27 Following Professor Sherry, I will refer to this latter
family of principles under the somewhat misleading heading,
"equality of results." 28
As applied to equal protection jurisprudence, Professor
Sherry's claim is that the decisions of the current Court are no more
or less conservative than the decisions of the Warren Court because
9
both accept formal neutrality and reject equality of results.2
Although this refined claim is certainly more plausible than Professor
Sherry's initial assertion, it contains two remaining weaknesses.
First, it seems equally if not more plausible to assert that the Warren
Court never definitively settled on either principle of equality.
Second-and perhaps more tellingly-even assuming that both
Courts' decisions do embrace the principle of formal neutrality, this
fact is of itself insufficient to establish that the current Court is no
more or less conservative in its equal protection jurisprudence than
was the Warren Court.
Suppose there is a society governed by Rex, a vicious and
arbitrary despot. At a certain point in time, the heads of powerful,
wealthy families and groups form a revolutionary party (the Anti-Rex
24. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 22-23 (1959).
25. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 477 (cited in note 1).
26. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1959).
27. See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1515-21
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988) (asserting that equal protection is best understood as embodying an antisubjugation principle that bars legislation drawing racial distinctions only if that
legislation perpetuates the subordination of traditionally subordinated groups).
28. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 478 (cited in note 1).
29. Id. at 462-63.
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Party or "ARP"). Enlisting the support of the masses with the
rallying cry of "good government," the leaders of the ARP stage an
insurrection. Rex flees to a modest estate in France, and, by means of
an uncontested election, the ARP's leaders are installed as heads of a
new government. Now suppose that after a generation of relatively
benign rule by the ARP, certain individuals attempt to break the
ARP's monopoly by forming the alternative Anti-Anti-Rex Party
("AARP"), which adopts the slogan "truly good government." Their
efforts are successful and they manage for a time to get AARP
candidates on the ballot and elected into office. Eventually, however,
the ARP regains all the seats it had previously lost to the AARP. As a
result, the AARP disbands.
An observer could describe this sequence of events simply by
reporting that this society was once, and is now again, committed to
the idea that one-party democracy is good government. But such a
description may be lacking in two respects. First, it is unclear
whether the revolutionaries' cry meant to equate good government
with one-party rule or instead meant only that one-party rule was
good government as compared to the then-available alternative.
Thus, the restoration of one-party rule may or may not be continuous
with its revolutionary establishment, depending on the content of the
unspecified (and, until the rise of the AARP, untested) standard of
"good government."
In addition, even if both the revolution and the restoration
actually do manifest a commitment to the "principle" of one-party
rule, the respective adoptions of that rule might still have differing
significance by virtue of the fact that the adoptions occurred against
the background of different prior regimes. Whereas the revolutionary
adoption of one-party rule over despotism likely constituted an
improvement by any plausible standard of good government, the restoration of one-party rule over two-party rule is on its face a more
ambiguous achievement.
Of course this hypothetical bears on Professor Sherry's
argument only insofar as the political circumstances under which the
current Court has adopted formal neutrality differ from those under
which the Warren Court adopted it. In fact, however, they do so differ. As Professor Sherry must concede, there was an interregnum
between the Warren Court and the current Court (from roughly 1978
to 1989). During that time, decisions like Regents of the University of
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California v. Bakke30 and Fullilove v. Klutznicks3 evinced the Court's
commitment to some alternative notion of "equality of results," under
which federal and state legislatures began to experiment with what
32
they believed were benignly discriminatory laws.

The existence of this interregnum poses both of the problems
identified above. First, even if it is clear that the Warren Court rejected the white supremacist principles of Jim Crow in the name of
"equality," it is not at all clear that the Court ever specified the positive content of that notion of equality sufficiently to determine
whether it embraced formal neutrality over equality of results. If the
Warren Court made no explicit statement to that effect, then to the
extent the current Court has made that choice,33 it has departed from
the Warren Court-at the very least by deciding a question the prior
34
Court never decided.
Second, even if it is clear that both Courts have in fact embraced formal neutrality as the proper principle of equality, one may
still plausibly assert that the current Court is more politically conservative than the Warren Court. If the Warren Court adopted the principle of formal neutrality, it did so as part of an effort to invalidate
Jim Crow laws. By contrast, the current Court has relied on the prin-

30. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
31. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
32. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 462 (cited in note 1) (acknowledging that the Court may
have strayed during this period).
33. The extent to which the current Court has rejected equality of results remains
somewhat uncertain because of the multiple opinions in Adarand. See Friedman, 50 Vand. L.
Rev. at 534-35 (cited in note 23).
34. As Professor Sherry notes, the decision that perhaps could have provided a complete
account of the Warren Coures theory of equal protection, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), was resolved on procedural grounds. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 466-67 (cited in note 1).
She nevertheless argues that Justice Douglas's dissent, which addressed the merits of the case
and appears to reject equality of result, is proof that the entire Warren Court rejected equality
of result. Id. at 466 ('Because Justice Douglas was perhaps the most consistently liberal
member of the Warren Court, his views on affirmative action are particularly noteworthy.").
If Justice
This argument rests on a curious assertion of inter-Justice transitivity:
Douglas--"the most consistently liberal member of the... Court--rejected equality of result, it
must be the case that each of his less consistently liberal colleagues also rejected it. See id.
Such an assertion amounts to the very sort of argument-by-labeling that Professor Sherry
elsewhere decries. The fact that Justice Douglas was very "liberal" about certain matters
(maintaining, for example, hostility towards government efforts to regulate private sexual
conduct) hardly entails that he was committed to a strongly egalitarian theory of social justice.
Hence his rejection of equality of result does not entail that others equally or less committed to
protection of those liberties must also reject it. Nor are we required to speculate about this
issue, since three members of the Warren Court-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White-did
not join Justice Douglas's opinion and were soon on record in favor of equality of result. See, for
example, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-79 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
It is unclear why Professor Sherry does not regard these Justices as equally legitimate
representatives of the Warren Court's (not fully articulated) views on equal protection.
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ciple of formal neutrality to invalidate affirmative action laws of the
interregnum. Thus, even if it is true that the current Court's equal
protection decisions are doctrinally conservative with respect to the
Warren Court 35 and thus evince the same degree of judicial conservatism, one may fairly ascribe greater political conservatism to the
current Court precisely because its judicial activism (unlike the
Warren Court's) has been designed to serve-and in practice has
served-to eliminate all race-conscious legislation, including
legislation attempting to alter the existing distribution of wealth and
opportunities in order to improve the lot of members of certain groups
36
that have tended to fare poorly in the private sphere.
One might counter this argument by claiming, as Professor
Sherry at times appears to,37 that the interregnum I have posited
never really existed because decisions like Bakke and Fullilove never
garnered a majority opinion espousing any one theory of equality of
result, and therefore never actually strayed from the principle of
formal neutrality. Since the Supreme Court has in fact consistently
adopted formal neutrality at all times between 1954 and the present
(the counter-argument continues), the current Court's embrace of
formal neutrality cannot be described as having a distinctly conservative political import.
This objection, to the extent it is cogent, 38 seems to rest on the
claim that decisions like Bakke should not only be discounted as
"weak" or "unclear" precedents, but also be ignored altogether as notlaw. Yet this further conclusion follows only if we accept a particularly stringent theory of law--one that requires as a necessary condition for the existence of constitutional law not only a majority in the
35. Note that if my description of the interregnum is correct, there is a second sense in
which the current Court is no more or less doctrinally conservative than the Warren Court:
both Courts were equally prepared to modify or reject the equal protection precedents of earlier
Courts. This observation only further demonstrates that the term "conservative" must always
be modified by reference to the thing being conserved.
36. Many critics of race-conscious remedial legislation argue that such legislation is in actual effect counterproductive to these egalitarian goals. They would thus maintain that the
current Court's restriction on such legislation has effects that are no more or less politically
conservative than the effects of the Warren Courts decisions. My point is only that since one
may plausibly reject these arguments, one may plausibly take issue with Professor Sherry's
claim that the current Court is no more politically conservative than was the Warren Court.
37. See Sherry, Vand. L. Rev. at 462 (cited in note 1) (arguing that it is unclear whether
the "fractured" Bakke and Fullilove decisions evidenced rejection of formal neutrality).
38. Even if the affirmative action statutes that were enacted and applied in this period are
and have always been unconstitutional, the current Court has arguably acted in a less judicially
conservative and a more politically conservative fashion by more aggressively enforcing this
constitutional limit against Congress and the states than its predecessor Courts.
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Supreme Court accepting or permitting a particular result, 39 but also
one coherent, principled theory supporting the result. One can appreciate the stringency of this test simply by noting that under it, there
may at present be no constitutional right to abortion. 40 By contrast,
alternative theories of law justify the conclusion that the courts of
this period permitted benign race-conscious legislation under the
Equal Protection Clause. Thus, for example, in 1980, Holmes's "bad
man" would have concluded that the Court had embraced some
version of equality of result. 41 Likewise, Ronald Dworkin's theory of
law would likely have led (and, at least as he applied it, did lead) to
the same conclusion.42
Jurisprudentially, the best hope of establishing that equality of
results was never the law for any modern Court lies, not surprisingly,
in an extreme version of legal process requiring that a rule be justified by reference to a single, coherent principle.4 3 But even if one
could claim that from 1978 to 1989 the Court did not embrace the
principle of equality of results because it never successfully provided a
single reasoned elaboration of that principle, it does not follow that
the Court was therefore consistently committed to the opposing principle of formal neutrality. Rather, the most that can be said is that
the Court during this time failed to articulate any law of equal protection. As a result, one may still fairly assert that the current Court's
equal protection jurisprudence is more politically conservative than
the Warren Court's insofar as it has ended the preceding period of
confusion among competing principles by settling on the arguably
more politically conservative principle of formal neutrality.

39.

For example, a majority of the Bakke justices indicated (albeit for different reasons)

that a Harvard-style diversity program would not violate equal protection principles. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 315-20 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and White, JJ.).
40. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-69 (1992)
(joint opinion of Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ.) (espousing multiple, possibly conflicting,
justifications for limited abortion rights).
41. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (law
is a prediction of what the courts will in fact do). And, of course, public officials and affected

private institutions generally did so conclude, enacting the various programs that have since
been thrown into doubt by the current Court.
42. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 223-39 (Harvard U., 1978).
43. This is not say that all Legal Process scholars subscribed to this criterion of
constitutionality. On the difference between various conceptions of Legal Process, see Anthony
J. Sebok, MisunderstandingPositivism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2054, 2095-131 (1995). 1 am grateful to
Professor Sebok for aiding my articulation of the following point.
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Professor Sherry's second task is to explain the awkward fact
that the vast majority of constitutional scholars has missed an
obvious pattern of inter-Court consistency.4 It would be absurd to
suggest that scholars devoted to this subject have simply overlooked
this fact, and I do not believe Professor Sherry makes this claim.
Rather, her assertion is that they have deliberately misdescribed (or
acquiesced to others' misdescriptions of) their own inconsistency as
the Court's.
The origins of the academy's inconsistency, Professor Sherry
argues, lie in its impatience over the pace of progress toward genuine
social and economic equality under the Warren Court's regime of
formal neutrality. 45 Eager to speed social change, the academy in the
1970s came to reject formal neutrality, to endorse the new constitutional principle of equality of results, and thus to endorse legislative
efforts to distinguish between people on the basis of race. The goal of
this shift was to hasten the realization of an equal distribution of
46
wealth and other social goods.

Of course, members of the academy could simply have acknowledged their change of mind and could then have proceeded to
criticize the current Court for its continued endorsement of the outmoded principle of formal neutrality. Professor Sherry contends,
however, that they have instead misdescribed their shift in position
as a conservative shift on the part of the Court. 47 To understand why
the academy did this requires an appreciation of the depth of the
current academy's rejection of neutrality. Indeed, this rejection is so
thoroughgoing that the academy has attacked not only the moral
principle of formal neutrality but also any and all concepts in the
extended neutrality family, including the epistemological meta-norm
that moral principles can be justified by neutral or objective reasons
holding good for all rational persons. 48 Caught up in skeptical
"postmodernism," the academy now believes that there are no genuine, objectively justifiable legal or moral rules or principles--only
44. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 459, 475-76 (cited in note 1) (stating that her task is to
explain why "most observers" have missed this "obvious" doctrinal consistency).
45. Id. at 478.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 476.
48. Id. at 482. For clarity, I will refer to this second sense of neutrality by the terms
"objectivity" and "objectivism."
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political stances. 49 Thus, the academy now assesses the validity of
moral and legal norms merely by determining the extent to which
adherence to them advances the particular political cause or causes
with which it happens to sympathize. Today, the Court's adherence
to the norm of formal neutrality serves to maintain white privilege
and thus functions as a hindrance to the improvement of conditions
for members
of minority groups-a cause the academy
supports-while the norm of equality of result is more congenial to
such a cause. 50 Irrationalist, postmodernist scholars therefore feel no
compunction in attacking the principle of formal neutrality by means
of a mythical narrative which misdescribes the current Court's
steadfast commitment to it as a conservative shift.51
Professor Sherry never clarifies whether she intends this explanation to apply to most members of the current constitutional law
academy or to some minority of scholars within it.52 Cast in its
strongest variant, her explanation rests on the claim that the current
constitutional law community overwhelmingly rejects formal
neutrality and embraces both equality of result and the Conservative
Court Myth as a byproduct of its overwhelming acceptance of
postmodern irrationalism. In its weaker variant, the explanation
rests on a claim that one important segment of the academy has
espoused a myth to which most other segments have at least acceded.
As it turns out, even the strong version of the sociological explanation may not explain the existence of the Conservative Court
Myth. Suppose the academy is filled with left-leaning postmodernists. Is it obvious why they have decided to foster a myth that praises
the Warren Court while trashing the current Court? By hypothesis,
the decisions of both Courts clearly embrace the formal neutrality
principle that the academy now regards as politically unacceptable
ideology. Why then single out the current Court for blame rather
than criticizing both Courts for fostering the same pernicious
ideology? Even if, during the Warren Court's tenure, the academy
had no reason to critique the Court (because it was using the formal
neutrality principle to obtain results the academy then favored), the
current Court is today applying the Warren Court's ideology to reach
politically unacceptable outcomes. Thus, it would seem that left-lean-

49. Id. at 478.
50. Id. at 483-84.
51. Id. at 483.
52. Compare id. at 477 (explaining that "our" attitude toward neutrality has been transformed), and id. at 478 (describing the "transformation of the academy"), with id. at 481 (noting
the transformation of "some opponents").
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ing irrationalists have good reason to attack the Warren Court as the
Court responsible for generating the ideology of neutrality that is now
producing bad political results. The strong version of the sociological
explanation needs some further argument to explain why the current
academy chooses to hold the current Court solely responsible for a
state of affairs brought about in the first instance by the Warren
Court.
In any event, the strong version of the sociological explanation
cannot possibly account for the academy's adoption of the
Conservative Court Myth because the strong version is, as Professor
Sherry ultimately concedes, manifestly false. Indeed, one need not
look past the work of prominent mainstream liberal scholars such as
John Hart Ely and Ronald Dworkin to establish its falsity. Dworkin
has devoted a significant part of his academic career to defending a
version of equality of result and objectivity in legal and moral
reasoning. 3 He thus rejects formal neutrality without rejecting
reason and defends non-formal-neutrality equality on the ground that
it is objectively justified. Likewise, as Professor Sherry notes, Ely has
made interesting objectivist arguments for some version of equality of
54
result.
These obvious counter-examples suggest that Professor Sherry
must endorse the weaker version of the sociological explanation,
which holds only that there is some group of scholars within the
community of constitutional law scholars that endorses equality of
result out of a commitment to postmodernist irrationalism. But to
concede this is to drain Professor Sherry's explanation of its force. It
may be that some members of the academy are irrationalists who
advocate equality of result, but this concedes that there are others
who are not, either because they endorse formal neutrality or because
they endorse equality of result on objectivist grounds. Even if we
make Professor Sherry's best case by assuming, however falsely, that

53. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 78-86, 393-97 (Belknap Press, 1986)
(rejecting skepticism and arguing for the constitutionality of affirmative action); Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously at 1-5, 223-29 (cited in note 42) (same); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity
and Truth. You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 87 (1996) (arguing against moral
skepticism).
54. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 478-79 (cited in note 1). Indeed, the most perplexing and
endearing feature of Ely's Democracy and Distrust is its simultaneous embrace of lawskepticism and moral objectivism: Constitutional/legal analysis of concepts like equality and
privacy is radically indeterminate, but political/theoretical analysis of the concept of democracy
can yield objective, determinate results, including a defense of affirmative action. See John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview (Harvard U., 1980).
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there is no significant academic support for formal neutrality, she
must still explain the willingness of objectivist scholars such as
Dworkin and Ely to embrace or accede to the myth of the conservative
current Court. If the current Court demonstrably endorses formal
neutrality, as Professor Sherry claims it has, her weak sociological
explanation of the myth only succeeds if she can explain why nonpostmodernist members of the academy have not simply made their
case first by conceding that current law is against them and then by
openly advocating its rejection on normative grounds. What could
possibly explain why these scholars (who, unlike the irrationalists,
believe in the necessity of justification by appeal to reasons) have
instead weakened their normative arguments for equality of result by
associating them with postmodernists' patently false descriptive
claims about the Court's jurisprudence?
III.
Because it flows from her sociology, Professor Sherry's normative attack on "equality of results" proceeds indirectly through an
attack on postmodernism. The argument runs roughly as follows.
Postmodernism is dangerous because, by denying the possibility that
norms can be justified, it renders Americans unable to reach a collective settlement on what might count as a fair allocation of society's
resources. Given this danger, the academy has good reason to reject
postmodernism and embrace objectivism. If one accepts objectivism,
moreover, one must (at least "presumptively") accept formal neutrality and reject equality of results. 55
There are at least two problems with this argument. First, the
argument does not even begin to demonstrate the invalidity or incoherence of postmodernism or the validity of objectivism. Far from it,
the argument asserts only that adoption of postmodernism is inexpedient to the attainment of a universally acceptable account of the fair
distribution of social goods, a goal that irrationalists might not share.
Moreover, a number of self-styled postmodernists conspicuously absent from Professor Sherry's list reject her claim that a commitment
to anti-objectivism entails the inability to endorse societal norms of
fairness or justice as opposed to an inability to justify those norms by
reasoning from uncontroversial premises. 56 It is thus incumbent on
55. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 485 (cited in note 1).
56. For example, Richard Posner argues that the norm of wealth maximization is justifiable notwithstanding that it cannot be proven "objectively" valid by means of philosophical
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Professor Sherry to explain why postmodernism is of itself radical and
dangerous, rather than unthreatening or-as some have suggested57-fundamentally socially conservative.
Second, and more importantly, even if we concede that we can
and should be objectivists, Professor Sherry's argument hinges on the
further premise that formal neutrality is obviously justified. This
claim is either confused or disingenuous. That it might be confused is
suggested by Professor Sherry's assertion that formal neutrality is
simply what kindergartners understand to be "playing fair." This
assertion appears to conflate formal renditions of the principle of
justice--"play fair" or "treat like situations alike"-with a particular
interpretation of those principles holding that playing fair and
treating like situations alike requires ignoring the race of the parties
in question. The former principles may well rest on easily grasped,
universal intuitive notions of justice, but that is only because they are
The formal neutrality interpretation of those
purely formal.
principles is, by contrast, contestable precisely because it is
substantive.
Professor Sherry knows all this. She concedes, after all, that
John Ely and Randall Kennedy have made objectivist arguments for
affirmative action and equality of result on the ground that "our
commitment to racial justice demands some deviation from... merit
standards."58 Indeed, she sometimes describes the notion of "equality
of results" as "substantive neutrality," indicating her recognition that
there are some who think that race-conscious remedies are consistent
with a "neutral" principle of justice. 59 But once the possibility of a
truly principled argument for a conception of equality other than
formal neutrality is conceded, the "obviousness" of Professor Sherry's
minor premise collapses. It turns out, contrary to the suggestion of
her title, that we did well to stay in school past kindergarten.
Professor Sherry tries to avoid this conclusion by suggesting
that the arguments of Ely and other "good liberals" for the
permissibility of affirmative action policies do not really question the
principle of formal neutrality; instead, they simply raise questions

argument. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law, in David G. Owen, ed.,
PhilosophicalFoundationsof Tort Law 99, 101-03 (Clarendon Press, 1995).
57. See Richard J. Bernstein, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Richard Rorty on
LiberalDemocracy and Philosophy, 15 Pol. Theory 538, 555-56 (1987).
58. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 480 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 466.
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about the most expedient means to that agreed-upon end. 60 But she
cannot make this move without recharacterizing formal neutrality
and thereby undermining her descriptive and normative theses.
As it is used in the bulk of Professor Sherry's Article, formal
neutrality refers to a principle of political justice holding that laws
must treat citizens equally without regard to race or creed. 61 Raceconscious legislation thus violates formal neutrality and, according to
Professor Sherry, the merit of the Warren Court and the current
Court lies precisely in their rejection of such legislation in decisions
ranging from Brown to Adarand.62 In treating Ely and other liberals
as arguing for an "expedient" exception to formal neutrality, however,
she redefines formal neutrality in terms of an ideal of social justice-a
"colorblind society" in which no one, government or private citizen,
takes race into account. 63 While this latter rendition of formal
neutrality is perhaps attractive, it is quite distinct from the principle
just described. Indeed, given this definition of formal neutrality (in
what sense does it remain "formal"?), governmental implementation
of affirmative action policies in any less-than-perfectly-just society
does not necessarily "violate" formal neutrality. Such action may in
fact turn out to be permitted or perhaps even required as the most
effective means to the realization of this end-state. In other words, if
formal neutrality was meant all along to be this end-state principle, it
is not obvious why Professor Sherry maintains that colorblind
legislation claims "the high moral ground"; 64 why it is only the
proponents of affirmative action (and not proponents of colorblindness
in legislation) who are making expedient arguments about "means"
rather than "ends"; why decisions like Bakke and Fullilove strayed
from the principle of formal neutrality; why the writings of scholars in
support of affirmative action should be interpreted as arguing for an
"exception" to formal neutrality rather than presenting a strategy for
its achievement; and why, in the end, there is any necessary conflict
between formal neutrality and race-conscious legislation.65

60. Id. at 480.
61. See note 6 and accompanying text.
62. 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995). See Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 483-85
(cited in note 1).
63. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 479 (cited in note 1).
64. Id. at 480-81.
65. Perhaps Professor Sherry's claim is that the principle of end-state formal neutrality
contains within it the distinct constraint that the end-state may not be achieved by laws that on
their face distinguish on the basis of race and creed. This is an intriguing idea, but, again,
hardly one that is self-evident.
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Professor Sherry concludes her Article by asserting her commitment to the Enlightenment aspiration that citizens should "abide
by a certain framework for deliberating through their disagreements"
premised on "a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction
with, the persons with whom one disagrees." s6 I would have hoped to
see in her Article a more substantial engagement with those with
whom she disagrees.
Scholars attempting to "define" American
democracy for the next century, particularly those engaged in the
charged and difficult debates about equal protection and race, must
come to terms with the history of legislative and judicial treatments of
race-neutral and race-conscious policies, must garner whatever
empirical information is available on the need for and effects of such
policies, must assess the relative merits of conflicting philosophical
theories of equality, and perhaps must assess the merits of arguments
for and against moral skepticism. In this Article, however, Professor
Sherry has shied away from these difficult tasks, choosing instead to
rely in the first instance on broad assertions-the Rehnquist Court is
the Warren Court; the academy's attacks on the Rehnquist Court are
the product of irrationalism; formal neutrality is obviously
acceptable-only to back away from each such assertion in a manner
that renders her analysis and arguments incomplete.
Perhaps Professor Sherry has adopted this rhetorical style of
argument as a means of responding to those whom she perceives to
have rejected the aspirations of the Enlightenment. If this is her
strategy, however, it is in danger of backfiring. The case for reason is
best made on the basis of reasoned analysis, and this entails exacting
scrutiny of the merits of all claims, even those made on behalf of irrationalism. Of course it hardly needs saying that Professor Sherry has
long been a distinguished and important contributor to our reasoned
discourse on equality. I look forward to her continued efforts to make
the case for merit on the merits.

66. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 485 (cited in note 1) (citing Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 79 (Belknap Press, 1996)).

